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Chapter 5 
MONTENEGRO: VASSAL OR SOVEREIGN? 
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Montenegro: Vassal or Sovereign? 
Octavian Sofansky, Stephen R. Bowers, Stephanie E. Cameron, and Marion T. Doss, Jr. 
Executive Summary 
A move toward Montenegrin independence would cause Serbian public opinion to 
focus inward and would likely be the first step in the process towards true democratic 
evolution. Russia is not likely to support Montenegrin independence and Russia is 
unlikely to take decisive action to save the Yugoslav Federation. The removal of 
Slobodan Milosevic from power will have a modest impact on the prospects for 
maintaining independence. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Serbia and Montenegro, with the help of Russian arms and through the Treaty of 
Berlin, July 13, 1778, were recognized as independent from the Ottoman Empire. The 
early 20th century saw the Serbian government ignite the fuse that sparked the World War 
II and its progeny, the fall of the great multinational empires, worldwide depression, 
World War II, and the Cold War. From the carnage of the Great War, representatives of 
Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, and Montenegro announced the creation of a new South Slav 
confederation, Yugoslavia, under the ruling Serbian dynasty. The history of this 
federation was troubled with the Serbs attempting to create a centralized Serb state and 
the other nationalities resisting this effort in an attempt to maintain some degree of 
autonomy. 
The Post Cold War period has witnessed both globalization and a revival of 
nationalism by oppressed peoples. The breakup of the Soviet Union and the 
fragmentation of Yugoslavia are two of the more dramatic examples of these phenomena. 
The policies of the Yugoslavian (Serbian) government under Slobodan Milosevic had 
exacerbated and accelerated nationalistic tensions. The 20th century, which began with 
such promise for Serbia, ended in failure and frustration. During the 1990s, Serbian 
power has been serially excluded from Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia, and 
Kosovo. All that is left outside Serbia proper is Voivodina and Montenegro. 
If Montenegro goes the way of the other republics, the idea of Yugoslavia is 
nonexistent. Serbia will lose access to the sea. Therefore, Serbian policy and the ability to 
salvage something from the current series of debacles are important issues for the peace 
and stability of the Balkans and Eastern Europe. The policy of the Russian Federation 
towards Serbia and the Balkans, Montenegro in particular, is also extremely crucial. It is 
the Russians who have shown an affinity to aid their South Slav cousins from the Tsarist 
Empire to the Soviet Union. 
The principal author looks at the Montenegrin question from an East-European 
perspective in the wake of Western opposition to ethnic cleansing and other distasteful 
practices, examining the ideas of Yugoslavian unity, the notion of a Greater Serbia, and 
the possibility and implications of Montenegrin independence. Crucial to the outcome is 
the extent to which Russia will come to the aid of Serbian policies and the post-Milosevic 
stance of the West on Montenegrin secession. 
STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF MONTENEGRO 
Montenegro has never before enjoyed the international importance it currently 
commands. Until October 2000, the Montenegrin leadership was traveling to Western 
capitals where it was assured of increased support. During this time, Western strategic 
analysts focused their attention on Montenegro, and NATO officers fill their folders with 
detailed maps and aerial photos of the region. There is a simple explanation for this 
international prominence that this small region enjoys: Montenegro is the final element of 
the Yugoslav federation outside of Serbia. Montenegrin independence would end the 
dream of a nation of southern Slavs and, as some optimists predict, the beginning of a 
democratic Serbia, an event which might bring a long awaited stability to the Balkans. 
Prior to October 2000, a Western-oriented Montenegro would have firmly isolated Serbia 
and Milosevic, making the economic blockade work and bring an end to the Milosevic 
regime. It was predicted that the mountainous republic would have to pay too a high price 
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for its independence, Strategists feared that "Montenegro will all too likely be the next 
war in the series that have pockmarked the death of the fantasy of Greater Serbia", DO 
Indeed, the little Adriatic country of 650,000 inhabitants and 13,812 square 
kilometers, the size of United States' state Connecticut, with no important mineral 
resources, and no strategic infrastructure has never before enjoyed such international 
prominence, It has been an isolated borderland that even the Turks were unable to 
control, paying little attention to the remote mountainous theocracy after the conquest of 
Serbia in 1389, In 1918, after more then five centuries of semi-independence, Serbian 
King Alexander Karadjordjevic, a son-in-law of Montenegrin King Nikola, backed by the 
Treaty of Versailles, incorporating Montenegro into the newly established kingdom of 
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, treating the inhabitants of Montenegro as Serbs, During this 
period, all symbols or reminders of Montenegrin sovereignty were suppressed, Even the 
traditional Montenegrin hat, which, displayed the Cyrillic initials of King Nikola, was 
banned and a new Serbian symbol was required to be worn atop formal hats, 
In 1945, Tito granted federal status to allied Montenegro to increase the voting 
power of Belgrade in the eight-man collective leadership of the newly established 
Yugoslav federation, relying on Montenegrins as the most loyal allies of Serbia, In this 
period, vestiges of the old monarchy were suppressed and Montenegrins seemed to 
accept their place in the Yugoslav federation, Apparently loyal to the end, Montenegro 
was the only part of Yugoslavia that voted in the 1992 referendum to stay in federation, 
The symbolic role of Montenegro assumed great importance over the years, The 
only Balkan military force not defeated by the Turks, it was seen by many as a beacon in 
their fight for independence, The Russians regarded Montenegro as the first free Slavic 
nation in the Balkans and their natural ally, while the Serbians saw Montenegro as the 
beginning of the Serbian independence and the cornerstone of Greater Serbia, The rocky 
highlands of Montenegro (Crna Gora), with their nucleus on the Zeta River, served as an 
important refuge to Serbs fleeing from the advancing Turks in the fourteenth and 
fifteenth centuries, Montenegro resisted as a semi-autonomous theocracy for three 
centuries before becoming fully independent at the end of the eighteenth century,131 
According to the 1991 census, the current inhabitants of Montenegro identify 
themselves 62% as Montenegrins, 15% as Muslims, 9% as Serbs, 7% as Albanians, and 
7% as others, While the majority of the popUlation belongs to the Orthodox Christian 
tradition (Montenegrins and Serbs), there is also a large Muslim popUlation and smaller 
numbers of Roman Catholics, This leads to significant support of a separate Montenegrin 
nation, a separate state, and a separate church, 
The geography of Montenegro is dominated by two high mountain ranges 
spanning across the country, The Montenegrin seacoast is a narrow strip of land running 
from Kotor Bay near Croatia to the Bojana River at the frontier with Albania, The high 
Dinaric Mountains of O~jen, Lovcen and Rimija rise from the sea, forming a magnificent 
background to the coastal strip but a great obstacle to communication between the coastal 
and inland parts of Montenegro, The old capital of Montenegro, Cetinje, is hidden high 
on the mountain of Lovcen, The Zeta plain bordering lake Skadar comprises the biggest 
lowland region of Montenegro and the most fertile area, It is dominated by the economic 
and political center of Montenegro, Podgorica (former Titograd), the country's capital, 
130 SMITH Dan, "Integrating Serbia into the Balkan region", Security Dialog Vol 30(3), PRIO, SAGE 
publications, 1999, 
131 G,W. Hoffman: "The Balkalls in Transition", D. Van Nostrand Company. New Jersey, 1963, p.40, 
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European and Euro-Atlantic integration, a path that guarantees a long-term stability and a 
clear prospective of economic development. All of these countries, except Yugoslavia, 
have in one form or another engaged in the integration process with the European Union 
and NATO. The most advanced candidates, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria, have 
opened negotiations for a full membership in the European Union. They are also the 
forerunners for NATO membership. Countries like Albania, Macedonia and, since 
recently, Croatia are members of the Partnership for Peace program sponsored by NATO. 
Even Yugoslavia through its foreign minister has unveiled its strategic goal to become 
part of the European Union. t35 
What one observes in the Balkans today is a complex process of integration that 
proceeds at various speeds. Throughout the region, both university scholars and 
government officials speak of the urgency of creating a more effective regional 
framework. Recognition of the need for a more concerted, balanced, regional approach in 
cooperation was demonstrated by the creation of the Stability pact for South-eastern 
Europe in 1999. The crucial significance of this agreement is that through its concluding 
Cooperation and Association Agreements, it offers the prospect, though a remote one, of 
membership in the European Union for all the countries in the region. Macedonia was 
first to benefit from this status, and Croatia and Albania next to follow. 
The notorious exception to this integration process is the politically and 
economically isolated and authoritarian Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, within which 
Montenegrins increasingly voice their dissatisfaction. Given its isolationist past and an 
affinity to Serbia few can predict the future of Montenegro. Several options appear 
plausible. The first envisions an independent Montenegro, coming out of a non-violent 
divorce with Serbia, as one of prosperous Adriatic mini-states, living on tourism and 
commerce from a larger Europe. The second scenario sees Montenegro as still a part of 
Yugoslavia, providing a democratic leader, like Vojislav Kostunica remains in office, as 
an equal part of a loose confederation. The third scenario predicts a violent break-up with 
Serbia, transforming Montenegro into a NATO protectorate, similar to Kosovo or 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, living on donations from the international community. The fourth 
scenario predicts the resurrection of a federal Yugoslavia, in which, the central 
government would exercise all significant powers under this scenario. Indeed, the crucial 
question asked by international community and the Montenegrins themselves, is how to 
avoid violence and to reach toward the European and world community at the same time. 
INTERNAL POLITICAL DUALISM 
The double-headed Montenegrin eagle reflects perfectly the dilemma of the 
country today. One head is looking to Brussels and the West and the other remains loyal 
to Belgrade. Since the 1999 crisis in Kosovo, the Montenegrin polity is crystallizing 
around the two options: independence or a continued federation. As in 19 I 8, when the 
local assembly voted for unification with Serbia, the Montenegrin patriots, under the 
green flag, confronted the Yugoslav patriots under the white. The Green Camp is 
growing constantly. Traditionally supported by the nationalist wing, the Diaspora, and the 
Montenegrin Autocephalous Orthodox Church, for the last two years it has attracted an 
increasing number of moderate parties and voters. The incumbent president, Milo 
135 VUKOVIC Borislav, "Yugoslavia and the European Union", Review of International An'airs, 1999, 
Issues o/" the Post-Communist Transition: Structure, Culture, and Justice 91 
Djukanovic, has emerged as a leader of the Montenegro drive for sovereignty against 
Belgrade's autocratic rule. 
Djukanovic, the president of Montenegro since the 1997 elections and a former 
Prime Minister, is an apparatchik. However, since becoming president he sharply 
criticized Milosevic for his confrontation with the West, and has enacted liberal reforms, 
launching a program of privatization, introducing the Deutsche Mark as the second 
cUITency in the country, and seeking cooperation with Montenegro's neighbors. During 
the NATO bombing campaign in 1999, Djukanovic blamed Milosevic for provoking the 
strikes but also called on NATO to stop the bombing. He repeatedly addressed the 
Western countries and international financial institutions (IFIs) for aid and investment, 
which was slow to come partly because of the blockade on Yugoslavia and partly because 
of unclear status of relations between Montenegro and Serbia. Internationally, the 
federation of Montenegro with Serbia was not recognized by the United States and many 
others, Russia and Cuba were among the few exceptions. t36 
The electoral block headed by Milo Djukanovic, "Da Zivimo Bolje," won the 
1998 parliamentary elections with 49.54% of the votes over the pro-Serbian Serbian 
National Party (SNP), which received 36.1 % of the vote. The three parties of the 
coalition; Social Democrat Party (SDP) of Zarko Rackevic, the People's Party (NS) of 
Dragan Soc and Djukanovic's Democratic Socialist Party (DPS), advanced a common 
platform, where they called Belgrade to accept confederate relations, stopping short of 
independence. 
Until 2000, the idea of a referendum on independence became increasingly 
attractive to many Montenegrins. Djukanovic used it as leverage against Milosevic in 
order to obtain a "redefinition of relations with FRY", which in fact would mean the 
maintenance of loose political affiliation with Belgrade and at the same time an 
opportunity to enact independent economic policies and qualify for Western aid and 
investment. Milosevic worked against this proposal by sponsoring pro-Serbian parties 
and increasing the Yugoslav Army (VJ) presence in the region. The utility of the 
Yugoslav Army, according to Belgrade professor Vojin Dimitrievic, is greatly enhanced 
by the fact that it was the only federal institution that still functioned in this fractured 
nation. 137 
The Liberal Alliance (LSCG), the longest consistent supporter and most active 
promoter of Montenegrin independence, has stayed aside from the governing coalition. 
Its supporters argue that Montenegro, as an independent nation was abusively 
incorporated into the Yugoslav Kingdom and the Montenegrin Autocephalous Church 
was subordinated by force to the Serbian Orthodox Church in 1920. Surviving in exile, 
for instance in Detroit, Michigan, USA, the Montenegrin Autocephalic Orthodox Church 
was reactivated in Cetinje in 1993. In the same year Dr. Vojslav Nikcevic published a 
book suggesting that "Montenegrins speak and write Montenegrin", different from 
Croatian or Serbian. 
Today the Montenegrin Diaspora, scattered around North America and Europe, 
who held their Second World Congress in August 2000 in the old Montenegrin capital of 
Cetinje under the patronage of President Milo Djukanovic, actively support 
independence. 
1]6 The US view is that the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) has dissolved and that none of 
the successor republics represents its continuation, Source: CIA Home Page, 
137 Interview, Graz, July 1,2000. 
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This pro-independence president can rely on his voters, the radical nationalists 
from LSCG, the Democratic Party of Socialists, the Social Democratic Party, the support 
of the Diaspora, the Montenegrin Autocephalous Church and the 20,000 strong 
Montenegrin police. Many Albanians and Muslims antagonized by Milosevic's behavior 
during the wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo also support Montenegrin 
On the other side there are supporters of maintaining Montenegro as a part of independence. 
Yugoslavia. Milosevic, loyal Serbs and Montenegrins as well as the 10,000 strong 
Yugoslav Army and 1,000 pro-Serb paramilitaries backed their former leader, Momir 
Bulatovic, the former president of Montenegro. After Milosevic was voted out of office, 
Momir Bulatovic also left his governmental position. 
The Socialist People's Party of Montenegro (SNP) is the strongest single party in 
the country. Momir Bulatovic established an electoral coalition known as "Yugoslavia-
SNP _ Momir Bulatovic." This coalition attempted to unite the pro-Yugoslav forces in 
the republic and is specifically addressed to two small Serb-nationalist parties: Serb 
Radical Party (SRS) and Serb People's Party (SNS). After the 2000 federal elections, the 
SNS gained the parliamentary seats allocated to Montenegro. 138 
After Milosevic was voted out of office the Democratic Opposition of Serbia 
became increasingly popular. Today DOS and the SNP have formed an alliance fighting 
for the formation of a united Yugoslavia. 
Historically, besides Serbia, Yugoslavian patriotism has found a more fertile 
ground in Montenegro, which saw itself as the beacon of the southern Slavic 
independence. The Montenegrins were ferocious fighters in the World War II resistance 
movement, they had a disproportionately high percentage of members in the Yugoslav 
communist party, and they were always over-represented on the federal level. Many 
Montenegrins will comment that they always went to Serbia to go to school and to 
assume authority. In addition, there is a large population in Serbia of native 
Montenegrins, while at the same time there is a large community of Serbs and Serb 
refugees in Montenegro itself. Just several years ago Montenegrins fought along with 
Serbs for Yugoslav unity in Dubrovnik. In addition to ideology and politics, the economy plays an important role in the 
development of this region. Montenegro, along with Macedonia and Kosovo, was one of 
the poorest republics of Yugoslavia. However, it was the Yugoslav central planning that 
allowed Montenegro to jump from a backward feudal society into industrialization and 
urbanization. Montenegro also became a tourist paradise during the summer months. 
Since the beginning of the recent crisis in Yugoslavia, the heavy industry has been in 
economic distress. The only revenues are provided by Serbian tourists, and, increasingly, 
by smuggling. Montenegrin government sources acknowledge that years of sanctions 
have fueled the black economy and the smuggling of cigarettes into Rome, which is 
costing Italy millions in tax revenues. 139 Indeed, many speedboats anchored in Kotor Bay 
belong to veteran smugglers who earned their fortunes in the Bosnian Conflict when a-
liter of gasoline smuggled by Albanians over Skadar Lake could be sold to Bosnian Serbs 
for a fivefold price. 
138lCG Balkans Report, 107,28 March 20(ll. 3, posted May 24, 2001 by www.crisisweb.org 
139 "Italy's Mafia obsession aids Milosevic-Montenegro", December 28, Brussels, (Reuters) by 
montenegro.com. 
r 
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144 Table 1. Preferred Status of Montenegro 
Federation Independence Confederation 
February 1998. 51.7 % 21.0 % 10.5 % 
May 1999. 38.8 % 28.9 % 20.5 % 
September 27.6 % 32.3 % 19.6 % 
1999. 
January 2000. 28.0% 36.1 % 22.5 % 
After the Spring 2000 elections, President Milo ~jukanov~c threat.ened to call a 
referendum on the question of independence in the near future. DJl.lkanovlc declare~ o.n 
the 4th of April 2000, "This spring or a bit later the referendum will happen. Serbia IS 
sinking deeper and deeper, its debts are accumulating, it has imposed a blockade on 
Montenegro, and is playing various tricks." 145 "A referendum offering a straight choice 
between Yugoslavia and independence could probably be won now," exp~rts of t~e 
International Crisis Group have stated. 146 The opinion polls show a constant 1I1crease 111 
support for independence. In July 2000, surveys indicated that 39.7% of Montenegrins 
Y I · 147 were in favor of separation of Montenegro from ugos aVIa. . 
On the other side, there were fears of a forced removal from offlce of 
Montenegro's pro-independence president. Former US .Secretary o~·. State. M~deline 
Albright repeatedly warned Milosevic "any change by torc~. of political situatIOn of 
Montenegro will be sanctioned." NATO's European forn~er n~llitary l~ader ':".esley Cl~lrk 
said at a news conference that Serbia is clearly prepanng for possible military acl10n 
against pro-western Montenegro. Clark declined to comment on any military preparations 
'1' . f 148 NATO may have made in this respect, but clearly warned MI osevlc not to mter ere. 
Both officials and the average citizens expressed great concern about the role o~ a 1 ,O~O 
member paramilitary force created by the Serbian governn;ent and statIOned 111 
Montenegro. This development was an ominous accompaI11ment to the already 
threatening role of the to,OOO soldiers of the Yugoslav Sec.ond Army that had ta~en over 
Montenegrin airports and set up pro-Serbian television statlO~s on I~S Montenegnn bases. 
Montenegrin officials complained, both in private as well. as 111 publtc, that th~ Serbs took 
these actions in an effort to provoke President Djukanovlc mto overreact1l1g 111 a manner 
that would bring about popular support in Serbia for a military.mov~ a~.ainst.Montenegro. 
In the meantime Milosevic was attempting to exercise hiS f111al 1I1strument of 
leverage against Montenegro. In July 2000, the federal ass~mbly,. disregarding the 
opposition, passed amendments to the constitution of Yugoslavia,. pav1l1g the way for. a 
new mandate to Milosevic. In response Filip Vujanovic, the Chairman of Montenegnn 
144 "Public Opinion in Cma Gora", CEDEM, Podgorica, April 2000. 
145 "Montenegro might hold independence referendum within months: minister", April 4, 2000 posted by 
montenegro.com 
146 "Montenegro: In the Shadow of the Volcano", March 21,2000, ICG Home Page 
147 "Za i protiv otcepljenja Crne Gore od Jugoslavije", Blic Montenegro, July 20, 2000 
148 NATO sees threat to Montenegro, warns Serbia, Lisbon, posted on March 29 (Reuters) posted on 
montenegro.com. 
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Parliament, announced that the government coalition of Montenegro will boycott federal 
elections in the fall saying, "Montenegro will not participate in any elections that would 
mean the ruling of Siobodan Milosevic.,,149 On August 25, in an effort to limit local 
participation in the elections, the Montenegrin government banned state media coverage 
of the election campaign. This ban covered all of Montenegro's public television and 
radio stations. 
Western support for Djukanovic was partly predicated on the judgement that, in 
the absence of credible opposition in Serbia, he constituted the only serious opposition to 
Milosevic in the Yugoslav context aiming at making Djukanovic the figurehead for all 
the opposition to Milosevic.1 5tJ However, in 1999, the Western powers urged Montenegro 
not to try to secede from Yugoslavia but to join Serbian opposition to confront Milosevic 
and work for democracy "from within.,,151 A new attempt to unite Serbian opposition 
under one banner failed again in July 2000 in Svety-Stefan, a Montenegrin resort. In 
speaking with Octavian Sofransky, many people from Podgorica, Belgrade, and Zagreb 
expressed their conviction that Yugoslavia's enduring political crisis is beyond the 
control of "democratic" forces. For these individuals, the only answer was one that would 
come from within Milosevic's political entourage. 
The UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata, said she did not see 
Montenegro becoming the next Balkan tlash point. However, the UNHCR was building 
up emergency facilities in the region, though she was cautiously optimistic the tense 
situation would not escalate to the extent of Kosovo in the late 1990s.1 52 The international 
crisis group called for a slow internalization of Montenegro through infiltration of NGOs 
as well as other initiatives. EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, 
Javier Solana, agreed that Montenegro should stay within the Yugoslav federation but 
with closer contact with other nations in the region. IS} 
The more radical members of this camp declared, "the Serb preparations for 
violent intervention against Montenegro's President Milo Djukanovic are clear and 
present, staying out of Montenegro will be impossible. Balkan stability and Yugoslavia's 
existence are in a direct contradiction, three more viable states, independent Montenegro 
and Kosovo, plus a democratic Serbia, may be the most stable outcome. The end of 
Balkan instability requires far more than bombing from 15,000 feet and peace-
enforcement. It may, ultimately, require military force to ensure the dismemberment of 
Yugoslav remnants.,,154 
The September 2000 elections brought about great changes in strategy for the 
entire Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Vojislav Kostunica, the Western-preferred 
presidential candidate, defeated Milosevic. After Milosevic left office the threat of 
violence ceased and the international community exhaled. Soon, the West began to 
expect Montenegrin anel FRY problems to dissipate, bettering relations and remaining a 
confederation. 
149 "The governing coalition will boycott federal elections", Pohjeda, Podgorica, July 23, 2000 
150 GOW James, "Montenegro: Where to take the fight", Security Dialog Vol 30(3), PRIO, SAGE 
pUhlications,1999. 
151 Italy's Mafia obsession aids Miloscvic-Montenegro, Decemher 28, Brussels, (Reuters) by 
montenegro.com. 
152 UNHCR says Montenegro not next Balkan flashpoint, Tirana, March 26 (Reuters) by 
IVww.montenegro.com 
15) Montenegro should stay in Yugoslavia, (APIMTI), March 29, by montenegro.com 
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For the first time since 1998, Djukanovic attended a session of the Supreme 
Defense Council on December 25, 2000. Since Milosevic was no longer in office, there 
were many changes to the military stationed in Montenegro. The most important 
development was the plan implemented in late March 2001 concerning the Second Army 
from Montenegro. , General Milorad Obravdovic, the commander of the Second Army 
was removed from his position. By mid-March, the Seventh Battalion was disband from 
Montenegro and was redeployed to Southern Serbia. The presence of the Yugoslav 
Almy remains in Montenegro although the VI's chief-of-staff, General Nebojsa asserted 
"the anny will not interfere in Montenegro's decision over its future status.,,155 
Today, the VJ is no longer regarded as a security threat to Montenegro, although, 
its presence remains, showing Montenegro and the rest of the international community, 
1· h f 11 1 . , . ,,156 "Montenegro has yet to estab IS U contro over It s terntory. 
157 Table 2. Preferred Status of Montenegro II 
Federation Independence Confederation 
April 2000. 25.3% 35.7% 19.8% 
October 2000. 19.0% 36.8% 26.1% 
January 16.1% 36.0% 33.7% 
20001. 
After the September presidential elections, the percentage of Montenegrin's who 
wanted to remain in the federation decreased dramatically. The idea of a confederation 
became more popular after Milosevic left office, thus demonstrating that many 
Montenegrin's were not against the FRY but were against Milosevic. The increased 
support of a confederation showed political duality within Montenegro. These statistics 
from January ended up playing a vital role in the April 2001 elections. 
The April parliamentary election results showed that the secessionist movement 
had approximately 42% of the vote while, just over 40% voted for the opposition 
party. t58 Although the results of this election were extremely close, Milo Djukanovic has 
"pledged to push on with plans for holding a referendum on independence.,,159 In 
Montenegro, referenda require the participation of 50% of all eligible voters to be valid. 
Those who support the federation plan to boycott this election, making it virtually 
impossible for independence to be achieved. 
Anti-independence voters were strongly represented in this election giving FRY 
President Kostunica and Pre drag Bulatovic, head of the Socialist People's Party, hope 
that the Yugoslav federation would stay intact. On the other hand it gave Djukanovic's 
155 VIP Daily News Report, 17 January 2001. 
156 ICG Balkans Report 107,28 March 2001. 7 Posted May 24, 2001 by Iittp:llwww.crisisweb.org 
157 Data from April 2000, October 2000, and March 2001 CEDEM polls. 
15H "Leaders Urge Caution in Montenegro," 
http://www.cnn.coml2001/WORLD/europeI04123/montcnegro.pol1.03/index.htmI23 April 200 I. 
159 bttp://www.cnn.com1200J/WORLD/curopeI04/24/montcnegro.pol1.02!index.htmI24 April, 200 I. 
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party the majority of seats in the parliament encouraging him that I'nd d 
. .. ' epen ence IS 
clearly a posslblhty for Montenegro. ' 
RUSSIAN POLICY TOWARDS THE BALKANS 
While Serbia has long been the dominant influence on Montenegrin ff' . 
R . I I I d" a ailS, USSIa 1as a so p aye an Important role 111 this region. Only recently has Ru . b 
.. M' 160 < SSIa egun 
glvmg ontenegro mcreased attention. Since the peace in Kosovo tl1 R . 
I·, I I ' e USslan po 1~lca rea m was to~ busy. with internal matters, such as the election of the new 
preSIdent and the "antIterronst campaign" in Chechnya. The newly elected R . 
'd VI d' . P' .. . USslan presl ent a llTI1r utll1 pnontIzed the revitalization of the system of vertical . 
. 'd R . h'l .. . " powel 
mSI e USSI~, w I e most fo.relgn pohcy objectIves were postponed. Foreign Minister 
Ivanov descnbed the strategIc balance with NATO and maJ'or super-powers d tl 
" b d" CIS ' . an 1e 
near-a roa states as Its sphere of strategic interest as priorities of the R . 
foreign policy.161 usslan 
Russia, a long-time Montenegrin ally, has contemporary concerns very diff ., t 
f h . I d d' I . eren Tom t ose It 1a unng t 1e Russian-Turkish Wars when Montenegrin Admi 'al M t . 
Z " . f h d' I . I a eJa m<~evlc .oug t un .el t 1e R~lsslan flag, and the naval school in Perast, an ancient 
Montenegnn port, trall1ed RUSSian marines. In Montenegro, there are portraits of R . 
. I' . usslan 
emperors 111 11~toncal. museums and the icons donated to the Montenegrin Orthodox 
chur~hes b~ thell' ~usslan .protectors many years ago. Many Montenegrins believe their 
relatIOns WIth RUSSIa pertall1 to the past, however one can spot symbols of the new Russia 
111 Montenegro today as well. The vanouard of Russia's oil exporters Lllk 01'1 h d 
" b " as rna e 
ItS pre~.ence 111 Montenegro a~ld a new airpla~e route has opened this year connecting 
PoclgoIlca and M~s~ow. Russlan~ se~m t~ be mterested in acquiring real-estate property 
on the sunny AdrIatIC coast, beanng 111 mmd that this is a visa free country. Mont . 
b . . enegrll1 usmessmen, 111 turn, are eager to open the immense Russian market for their 0 d 
D· I . h . g 0 s. tp omatlc. exc an~e.s are bell1~ made between Montenegro and Russia as well. The 
Montenegnn authontles, followll1g their goal for international recognition have s t-
" . . .". MI" ' e up a tepresentatIon 111 oscow w ule, a RUSSIan consulate opened in Podgorica. 
The Balkan policy of the Russian Federation has recently entered a new pl1a 
D ·' I 19th .. se. 11l1l1g t 1e century 111 an attempt to gam the access to Mediterranean the R1IS . 
E · . I d . , SIan 
"mplre proVIC e VItal support for the Balkan region, particularly Slavic nat' 
. h' d Ions, 
sponsonng t e II~ e~endence movements of the Montenegrins, Serbs, Bulgarians, and 
?reeks .. After wll1nmg World War II, Soviet Russia attempted to control the Balkans 
Ideol0!5lcally. The present-day Russian Federation has become a distant observer from its 
~ases m Eastern Moldova and Sevastopol on the Black Sea. Since NATO announced that 
It. regards South~aster~ Europe as a zone of strategic interest, Russia, has tried to avoid a 
chrect. confrontatIOn WIth NATO. Even after signing a Russian-NATO charter, Russia still 
occaSIOnally attempts to bargain for some advantages. 
Bulgaria and, politically and economically isolated, Serbia continue to nurture 
warm feelings toward Russia although this former ally has slowed financial and political 
su~port. In a desperat~ .atte~pt to. recei ve badly needed external support during the 
I~elght of the K~sovo cnsl~, M!lo~evl.c also referred to Russia as a "traditional ally." He 
lequested Yeltsm to adlTIlt SerbIa mto the Russia-Belarus Union. Setting aside the 
I""A I t· . 
searc 10 the archives of major Russian newspapers revealed nothing pertinent concernina 
Montenegro. '" 
"" The NIS Observed: An Analytical Review, Volume V, Number 8 (16 May 2000). 
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geographic unfeasibility of the project, Serbia being isolated from Russia by EU and 
NATO candidates, the current union itself is hardly functioning economically or 
politically. A 1999 Russian opinion poll revealed that only 28% of the public favors the 
union while 69% are against it. 162 After observing the union, Moscow sees it as an 
economic burden and a political embarrassment. This is primarily due to President 
Lukashenko's notoriously undemocratic rule in Belarus. The rationale of union survival 
lies in the geo-strategic realm, namely Moscow's fear of NATO reaching Russian 
frontiers. Milosevic's appeal generated little support among the Kremlin leadership, thus 
demonstrating the limited geo-strategic significance of Yugoslavia in Russia today. 
Instead, Moscow's reaction to the Kosovo crises focused on a diplomatic effort to get a 
stake in the post-conflict arrangement and on military maneuvering to test the cohesion of 
NATO forces. In Moscow, anti-NATO campaigns found fertile ground among Russian 
nationalists, but debates about the cost of peacekeeping efforts in the former Yugoslavia 
indicated that other issues were influencing Russian politics. The former Yugoslav 
ambassador to Moscow, Borislav Milosevic, acknowledged in an interview that the idea 
of joining the Russia-Belarus Union had been discussed in Belgrade before the bombing, 
and on March 24, 2000 the Yugoslav parliament requested observer status in the Union. 
He did admit both; the Yugoslav opposition and Montenegro oppose the idea of the 
union. i63 The appeal was followed by Milosevic' s petition to the presidents of Russia and 
Belarus in which he declared, "Yugoslavia is ready to join the union." Milosevic argued 
on the basis economic complementarities, "multiculturalism," and the Orthodox religion 
commonality. 
Yugoslavia as a whole might have supported Milosevic's move to an alliance with 
Russia, but in Montenegro things are seen differently. A recent opinion poll shows that 
only 16% of ethnic Montenegrins in the republic supported adherence to Russia-Belarus 
Union compared to 53% of ethnic Serbs. The same source indicates that both Serbs 
(65%) and Montenegrins (87%) support the eventual joining of Montenegro to the 
European Union. i64 
The idea of aligning with Russia is not new in Yugoslavia. Vojslav Sesel, the 
leader of the Serbian Radical Party, suggested it in 1993. Although this idea faded away, 
it was resurrected in 1999 under the imminence of NATO bombing. Russia and 
Yugoslavia signed an agreement on military cooperation, but it was suspended because of 
the UN embargo. Belgrade then made a new attempt to make Russia an ally. 
This Yugoslav initiative was received with varied reactions from Russian 
politicians. Constantin Zatulin, leader of the "Derzava" movement, suggested, Russia 
should increase assistance to Yugoslavia. This assistance would be given through 
deliveries of military equipment. Alexei Mitrofanov from the ultra-nationalist LDPR 
(Zhirinovski's party) argued for the acceptance of Yugoslavia into the Union and bring 
the country under the Russian nuclear umbrella. In Mitrofanov's opinion, this action 
would guarantee the end of the conflict and resurrect the legendary Russian might. Elena 
Zazulina from the reformist "Yabloko" block insisted that a union with Russia and 
Bulgaria would only be considered only after the end of military conflict. Instead, she 
suggested a referendum. 165 
1(,2 Moscow News opinion polis, i 5-22.04.1999, MN Home Page. 
1(,3 SOLOVIEV Vladimir, "Belgrade longing for an Union", Vek weekly, No.8, March 25-03, 2000. 
164 "Public Opinion in Croa Gom", CEDEM, Podgorica, April 2000. 
165 "Two questions to politicians", KOlIIsollloiska),a Pravda, April 14, 1999. 
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.' Russian. hawk.s trumpet.ed the is~ue of military involvement throughout the 
conflict. In an 111tervlew Sergei Govoruhl11 a popular Russian J'ournal'st I' d 
" d . . ' c , I , comp ame 
to. ay no one takes. RUSSia m.to account. .. NATO freely demonstrated its superiorit ~unng th.e ro.cket-aenal v0'yage m Yugoslavia." He believes the only way to stop the w; 
is b~ dehvenng ~10dern an'-defense systems to Yugoslavia. Govoruhin stated that "ten 
n:~bile C-3.00 umts can fully c.ontI:ol the yugoslav air." He believes that the threat of a 
dllect RUSSia NAT.O ~onfrontatIOn IS not hIgher than in Vietnam or Afghanistan.i66 
~t the ~eg111111ng .o~ the. Kosovo bombing in March 1999, the custom officers of 
Baku AIrport 111 AzerbaIdJan impounded the Russian-made transport plane "R I " 
'th 5 T . '1' , us an , WI ml itmy pi ots on board. Accord111g to accompanying documents, the cargo was to 
be t~ansported from Kazakhstan to Slovenia; other sources, however, indicated its actual 
dest111ation as Belgrade. 167 
O.n. April 2, 19:9 Russian military leaders made known that they intended to send 
an eXpedItIOnary RUSSian fleet to the Adriatic. This fleet was composed of 7 vessels: two 
destroyers, two guard vessels, a transport, and an intelligence Sllip 11eaded by th .' . 
"Ad . I G I k ,,168 e Cluiser 
"L' mIr~, 0 °hvdoM' In th? end, only one Russian military ship, the Sevastopol based 
llnan, reac e ontenegnn waters some two weeks later. 
. Despite attempts to blacl~i~ail. NATO, Russian military and political 
establIshments have kept more reahstlc Views concerning NATO f· Th f 
. . . olces. e ormer ~us~i~n Defense MinIster, Igor Rodionov, stated, "Russia has to give up its Soviet-time 
ambItIons .... It should by no means accept to be dragged into a In'I't fl" I 
. II ary con Ict Wltl 
NATO, and should focus on the mternal political economical and o· I bl 
. . . . . . ' s Cia pro ems 
pmticularJy on aVOldmg a CIVIl war, and thus escaping NATO help to R "t If I 
Y I d I "i69 USSIa i se on tle ugos av mo e. 
N?netl~ele.s.s, ~uring .the ent~re Ko~ovo conflict, Russia actively supported 
YugoslaVIa WIth mtelligence mformatIOn Usmg land-radars and space b d t f 
b · " . . . - ase sys ems 0 o servatIOn, RUSSian mIlrtary staff closely followed the developmellt f th Y I 
. . NT' 0 e ugos av ~ItUat.IOn. A a com~11anders accused RUSSIa of supplying the Yugoslav army with 
mtelligence data. R~ISSIa never denounced these accusations. Instead the military proudly 
acknowledge? that itS suggestions helped the Yugoslav army to avoid substantial human 
losses, espeCially for the 40,000 strong Serbian Army in Kosovo R . . tIl' 
. I . '. . . . USSIan m e Igence 
a
l 
sObad~mt~ed tO
f 
t~llm~ the Yugoslavs not to dIsclose their entire air-defense system with 
t le eg11111l.ng 0 aIr rat~s; a surprising tactic for NATO planners. 170 
. TrYll1g to get ll1ternatIOnai leverage and unite the fragmented Russian voters 
aga1l1~t an eX,ternal threat on the eve of new presid~ntial elections, the Moscow power 
hold~rs attacked NATO. They.threatened NATO WIth strong pressure inside Russia for 
sendmg volunteers to the conflIct, large deliveries of arms and includincr Yu I . . 
the Russia-Belarus union.l7I b gos aVIa 111 
'. Even with an ample anti-NATO campaign, Russian public opinion never favored 
mi.ht.ary support for Yugos~avia. In October 1998, 44% of Russian respondents in an 
0p11110n poll favored the action and 53%were against. Six months later in April 1999, at 
166 "Two questions to politicians", KO/llsolllo!skal'a Pravda April 14 1999 
16: "Visits", Km/lsolllo!skaya Pravda, March 31, '1999.' ,. 
16H"W'IIR . . 
, I usstan vessels crash With NATO Beet?", KOlllsolllo!ska)'a Pravda A '12 1999 16') HT . . . I pn , 
1711 wo questions to pohtlcians", KOlllsolllo!skaya Pravda, April 14, 1999. . 
171 PROKOPENKO Serghey and BARANETZ Victor, "Inl(Jrmalion wars", Komsol1wiskava Pravda March 31 1999 
ARBATOV Alexey, "How to unite the Balkan nodes", Nczavisima),a Gazeta, May 7,1999.' ,. 
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the height of NATO strikes, only 36% were in favor, with 61 % against. An even larger 
percentage declared its readiness to go to fight as volunteers in Yugoslavia, but there has 
been no confirmation of organized Russian military groups fighting on the Serbian 
side. 172 Nor could any Russian volunteer face a NATO pilot flying at 30,000 feet. 
Vasili Axenov, a well-known Russian intellectual, portrayed Russia as "One hand 
protesting, stretched in a fist, the other begging the West with humiliation.,,173 He 
condemned the ambitions of the Russian leadership and the "wave of hysterical anti-
Americanism." Axenov called upon Russia to act as a mediator. 
There is a long history of mediation in this region. Upon arriving in Belgrade on 
March 30, 1999, Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov, accompanied by Defense 
Minister Sergheev and Foreign Minister Ivanov, proclaimed his intention to "attempt a 
political solution ... by enabling Yugoslavia to defend its rights on the international 
scene.,,174 Belarus President Lukashenko, in a visit following that of the Russian 
delegation, voiced his support for the "Primakov's initiative." Over the next two weeks 
the Russian ambassador in Belgrade, Yuri Kotov, arranged numerous visits by Russian 
representatives including the President of the Russian Duma, Gennady Seleznyov and, 
the Russian Patriarch Alexi n. He also presided over the repatriation of Russian citizens, 
about one thousand, whom left Yugoslavia during the bombing campaign.
175 
On April 
22, a new Russian mediator, Victor Chernomyrdin, arrived in Yugoslavia. Chernomyrdin, 
a former Prime Minister as well as a special representative of President Yeltsin, 
proclaimed that his mission was "to convince the United States and NATO to stop 
bombing Yugoslavia, and ask Yugoslav leadership to soften its position and relaunch the 
talks". 176 
Russian diplomacy has neither succeeded in proposing effective solutions for the 
crisis nor in securing a firm place for Russia in the post-connict arrangement. Moscow's 
diplomats demanded a separate zone of control for Russian peacekeepers, but NATO, 
fearing a de-facto partition of Kosovo much like the post-World War II partition of 
Germany, refused to accept their claim. Feeling its honor at stake, the Russian military 
command ordered its troops to occupy Pristina Airport, several hours before NATO, 
using a part of its peacekeeping force stationed in Bosnia. This military-political triumph 
was short lived, however, the Russian contingent in Kosovo was forced to accept a 
NATO command. According to Illtellectual Capita, the Russian Supreme Commander, 
President Boris Yeltsin, planned this maneuver in the utmost secrecy. NATO generals 
were not the only ones taken by surprise when the Russian paratroopers arrived; it was 
only after receiving presidential approval that the Chief of Russian General Staff, 
Anatoliy Kvashnin, informed his boss, Russian Defense Minister, Sergheev. Neither 
Prime-Minister Sergheev, nor Chief Intelligence Officer Vladimir Putin knew about the 
paratrooper launch. l77 Another Russian strategic ploy was the use of Pristina Airport for a 
large deployment of Russian troops. This plan was proven futile when Hungary, 
Romania, and Bulgaria refused to open their air space to Russian military planes. 
172 Moscow News opinion polls. 1998-1999, MN Home Page. 
173 SAPOJNIKOVA Galina "Vasiliy Axenov: 1 know the recipe for peace". KOl/lsol1wlska)'a Pravda, March 31, 1999. 
174 TCHIZIKOV Maxim, "Do not shoot the peace-makers: they playas they can", KOl1lsollloiska),a Pravda, March 31, 
1999, 
175 KOTOV Yuri, "Russian Embassy under the Bombs", Review oj llllcmaliollai Affairs, September 1999, 
JJti GAMOV Alexandr, "Tchernomyrdin _ the heavy artillery in the Balkans", KOlllso/llolskaY(l PrCII'c/a, April 14, 1999, 
177 GOLTZ Alexander, "Russia beat NATO for one day", illtellectl/al Capital, No,25, June 23,1999, 
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Russian forces faced two real challenges' the lack of t 'd d k" " ' rame mo ern 
peace, eepmg U11lts and the fl11ancIaI burden of peacekeeping, According to Al d 
Golz 111 Intellectual Capital, "Moscow's plan to control an e t" t" K
exan 
r , nile sec 01 111 osovo
reqtured at least 10,000 troops while the maximum that the arIny was bl t 'd 
I 
" a e 0 proVI e was 
on y 3,600, The low number is due to the rest of the troolJS needl' t", d , I " ng lal11l11g an 
eqUIpment tlat would not be ready in time",178 Secondly RussI'a' , f ' f U ' d " " ' s pIe elence or a 
l1I,te NatIOns I,n~nd~te was dIctated by fmancial concerns, The NATO framework 
oblIges each partlclpatl11g country to honor its bill forcing RussI'a to d' $150 
'II' ' " , "Ispense over 
ml IOn a year. The BosI1Ian battalIOn IS already taking half of the 440 million ruble 
annual budget for peacekeeping operations as approved by the Russian Du 
D' tl f Y I rna, 
, ' unng , le en Ire ugos av crisi~, Ru:sian policy on Balkans was spontaneous, 
IeactIve, and hIghly contextual. The major CrIses like the ones I'll Bo' d K , , " sI1la an osovo 
br?ught sudden mledl~, dIplomatic, and military reverberations in Moscow, When thes~ 
CrIses were past, t le Issue was forgotten and new issues and prI'orl'tI'es a d 
'd ' ' ppeare : a new 
presl ent, a new executIve power, and recrional reform HoweveI' I ld 
, ' , , b ' , one s lOU not 
underestImate the unpredIctabIlity of Russian policy Accordl'ng to Mit BI d f " ' " agare un en 0 
the UI1Iverslty of Westml11ster, "NATO's avoidance of the UN Sec "t C 'I " UII Y ouncl was a 
test ~f Russum strength, sho,wl11g that there is little Russia could do in the Balkans 
RUSSians, who opposed bombl11g, watched it and were completely powe I d ' " " r ess an l11actlve, 
Howevel, such blatant disregard of a former superpower may and w'll b' kf' 'h 
f CI I 
" 179 I dC Ire, as 111 t e 
case 0 lec my a , 
By examining Russian behavior in previous Yugoslav confll'cts d' 
"bl ' " ,o e may pre Ict 
POSSI e RUSSIa~l reactIons 111 the event of a greater Montenegrin crises and then ~ormula,te a polIcy th~t wIll prevent Russia from working against the interests of th~ 
l11ternatlOnal commuI1lty, Generally the Balkan region inc\udl'ng Y I" 
I
, I ,',', ' ' , ' ugos aVIa, IS not a 
lIg 1 pUOllty fOl the RUSSian FederatIon, Therefore, one conclusion may be th t R ' 
'11 'I h ' , a USSIa WI nelt ler support t e Monten~gnn l11dependence movement nor attempt to save the 
remnants of the Yugoslav FederatIon, 
Russia continued to supply Milosevic with military intelll'gellc H ' 
f 
' d' " e, owever, 111 a 
case 0 a pJOtracte CIvIl war, RUSSIan volunteers armed with light Rl s' ']' , ' I " IS Ian ml Itary 
eqlllpment, ITIIg lt have entered, Montenegrin territory, Their role would have mirrored 
b
that bO~ the sever~1 h~1I1dred RUSSIan volunteers who journeyed to Serbia during the NATO 
om I11g campaIgn 111 1999, 
, Should NATO forces th~'eaten a new attack on Serbia, a highly unlikely even 
smce the electoral defeat of Mllosevic, Russia would probably resum 't d' I ' ff t t, T' ' , , e I s Ip omatlc 
e or ,s 0 pI,event ITII, Itmy l11terventlon whIle also offering its services as a mediator in the 
conflICt. If l11terventlon takes place, Russia would undoubtedly demalld f I , " ' a zone 0 contro 
and, If refused, It mIght once again use the Pristina airnort as a I d' I M ' ' l' an l11g zone, n 
ontenegro RUSSIa could rely on popul,ar ,suppo:t of the large pro-Serbian community, 
, At th~ July ~OOO, G-8 summIt 111 Okl11awa, Russian President Putin and US 
PreSident Cll11ton dIscussed Montenegro and the Balkan Cl'l'Sl'S The t d "tl " " y S resse le 
Importance of democratIC government in Montenegro and President D' k '" 180 M I" I b ' ~u anovlc , 
any po ItIca 0 servers 111 Eastern Europe-from Montenegro to Moldova-have seen 
I7R 179 GOLTZ Alexander, "Russia beal NATO for one day", intellectl/al Capital, No,25, June 23,1999, 
Intervtcw, Peras!, Montenegro, .r uly I, 2000, 
1811 "cr d' lIlton an Putm discussed Milosevic's attempts to destabilize Crna Gora" P b' d P d " J 20, lOOO, ' , ,0 .Ie a, 0 gOl/ca, uly 
102 Montenegro: Vassal or Sovereign 
in that a promise of a decline in the long-standing unconditional Russian support for FRY 
unification, 
MULTILATERAL IMPLICATIONS OF MONTENEGRIN INDEPENDENCE 
"A unilateral declaration of independence by Montenegro will bring civil war", is 
a popular claim by those in the Balkans, Milosevic would be happy to open a new 
offensive to extend his "legitimization" as the defender of the Yugoslavian motherland in 
defiance of "American imperialism", Many Montenegrins who do not want 
independence, pledging allegiance to Greater Serbia, will support him, The community of 
Serbian refugees from Kosovo and Bosnia, some 32,OOO-strong in Montenegro, will also 
oppose secession, Finally, most East Europeans simply do not believe that anyone can 
defeat the Yugoslav army, always loyal to Milosevic, on the ground in the Balkans, 
Montenegrins have never taken up arms against the Serbs, In numerous 
conversations, they made this point to Octavian Sofransky during his visit to the region, 
"Going ahead with the referendum on independence for Montenegro would risk 
radicalizing a popUlation still peacefully divided over the issue, and would offer 
maximum provocation to Belgrade, which retains a powerful military presence in 
Montenegro", 181 An armed struggle would highlight the status of hundreds of thousands 
of Montenegrins living in Serbia, Unlike Kosovo, where Albanians had a large majority, 
which increased after the Serbs fled, or Bosnia-Herzegovina, where Serbs have obtained 
a territorial autonomy, Montenegro has no other division, than political, between the 
nationalist Greens and unionist Whites, 
During his visit to Montenegro in July, Sofransky observed that there was a very 
complex mosaic of allegiances, a multi-layered political process, and a grotesque 
historical heritage that render the apparent Green and White palette extremely nuance, 
Montenegrin society is a duality; there are two parallel currencies-the Yugoslav Dinar 
and the German D-Mark; two churches-the Serbian Patriarchate and the Montenegrin 
one, even two capitals-the capital city Cetinje and the main city Podgorica, Some 
people claim they speak Serbian, some affirm that they speak Montenegrin, some use the 
Latin, some the Cyrillic alphabet. Almost half want an independent Montenegro while the 
other half prefers a common state with the Serbians, However, there is no one clear 
boundary within the Montenegrin society, since these predilections overlap and extend 
well beyond Montenegro into neighboring Serbia where the business class uses the Latin 
alphabet and the D-mark as well. Montenegrins have conformed to duality and prefer to 
live with it rather taking one final decision, 
A negotiated settlement, leading to a non-violent independence for Montenegro 
implies an agreement from Belgrade, Prospects for this look grim, however, as long as 
this independence is perceived in Belgrade mainly as an anti-Serbian conspiracy of the 
West. Since the political and economic pressure applied on Belgrade did not function 
before, in case of non-Serbian territories like Bosnia or Kosovo, it is even less probable 
than they might function today in Montenegro-"a symbol of Serbian civilization," 
Montenegro and Serbia are in de facto confederation relations and are learning to accept a 
parallel existence, What could not be done during the violent collapse of Yugoslavia, 
namely a "velvet divorce," may be the ultimate result. 
181 "Montenegro: In the Shadow of the Volcano", March 21, 2000, International Crisis Group Home Page, 
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, A quick multinational intervention is the third w " 
ObVIOusly the only party who can provl'd ' ay to attam mdependence, 
M 'e secunty guarantees fo' ' d ontenegro is NATO, Even if a NATO I d f 1 an m ependent 
independence-minded republic, how much time :Oll~r~e should be, deployed in the 
could leave? 1 e needed until the peacekeepers 
Ultimately, the issue of the partition of M t ' 
northern districts of the country are trad't' II on e~eglO can be resuITected, The 
d ' ' Ilona y pro-Serbian More to ay s Montenegro such as the bay of K t "h ' over, several parts of 
I ' 0 or m t e south and part f S d' k ' nort 1 were granted to the republic by Tl'to d 0 an Ja 111 the 
an were never part of M t b 
The status of an independent Montenegro and 't r ,on enegro ~fore, 
unanswered question Montenegl'o I'S a It' t' I I S po Ihcal system IS another ~ , , I11U ma IOna count' [I ' 
population describes itself as Montenegrin 01 ' ,IY, ess t lan two-thu'ds of its 
'th h d ' I e can enVISIOn the M'lced ' , WI ,t e evelopment of a Montenegrin civic identit h' ,oman scenano, 
ethl1lc groups, It will take many deCIdes I y ,t ~t would be embraced by other 
Montenegrin, ' , lowevel, or a Serb to call himself a 
Today, the symbols of Montenegrin st'ltehood t1 ' 
blue uniforms and the famous urban con I' V are le oml1lpresent policemen in 
money it hosts several ministries a: well :~ eax tector Off Podgorica: built by private 
t' d M' 'par ments or government e I A re Ire ontenegnn minister spoke about the need for I " , mp oyees, 
and admitted that the local political e t, bl' h nore up,hftmg natIonal symbols 
defiant Milosevic, resembles an olig'lrch~ca relS, ment: honce deprI.ved of the figure of a 
h ' gllne WIt no rationale for 't ' one, e maintained, knows who would aSSum ' , I S eXIstence, No 
opposition in an independent Montenegro P ~ pr~~me~ce 111 and take the role of an 
should be a central objective whether d ',Iomo mg , emocracy within Montenegro 
acceptance of its status as part of the Feodne Itn conAcert WIth a drive for independence or 
d ' "~ era lon, s things stand tod th I emocratlc politics are absent. ay, e e ements of 
The next issue in contemplatinu the fut ' 
reconstruction, The inclusion of Monte b" ure of Montenegro IS economic 
'd neglO mto the St'lbility Pact f k proVI e for critical investment into infrast t b' ,ramewor will 
f ' , " ruc ure ut a long term st t ' orelgn mvestment and prospects for EU b h' - fa egy requIres 
M t " 'mem ers Ip A fervent t f 
onenegnn melependence tolel Sofransky " ' , suppor er 0 
immediately join the United States" Wh ~t I once WI e get 111dependence we should 
M ' a le meant lowever W'IS that'd ontenegro will have to rely on US sec "t d' ," an 111 ependent 
f' , Ull Y an economIc SUpport a d b unctIOn as a genuinely independent nation, ,n was una Ie to 
After spending three weeks in Montene ro talk'. , 
politicians, Sofransky's impression is th t thg , mg ~o ~cademlcs, students and 
. , ' , a e country IS Il1deed l' ad f' If govemance, has a certam Identity political I'nstl't t' dey 01 se -
't t f ' " u IOns an an economic s t bl' I 0 unctIon parallel to Yugoslavia How M ys em ena mg 
by a sudden break, It is not ready to ~penl ever'f ontehnegr~n society would be devastated 
, y con ront t e MIlosevic reg' , l11ternal tensions, The pragmatists in Montene 'h d ~ lIne or to cope WIth 
towards greater sovereignty and this ap' ,glO ave a opted the gradualist strategy 
culture, ' plOac 1 seems to work in this Mediterranean 
Today, many see Montenegro as the ke for Balka ' 
YugOSlav appendix Serbia might final[ f y , n peace, RelIeved of its 
, bl ' Y ocus mward on the pr ' , plO ems and opt for democratization anel c t' ' , ~ssmg economIc 
However, it might also be that Monteneuro ~~~~~~,Ion ~,Ith the Il1ternatIonal community, 
new Vietnam, which will immerse th: futur~ ~f~rlkor a newlPr?tracted ci~il war, a 
a an peop e 111 uncertall1ty, The 
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Montenegrins, however, do not think in purely strategic terms but tend to focus on a 
much more important, if disruptive, concept: their honor. With that as the focus for so 
many, the prospects for peace in the Balkans wiJl remain clouded in the uncertainty uf a 
potentiaJly violent post-communist nationalism. 
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